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STABILISATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA AND THE 
IMF: A Critical Review And Prolegemonon - As 
Illustrated By Tanzania
By Reginald Herbold Green1
Mistakes are mistakes.
-President Julius Nyerere
The crisis in Africa in recent years is 
overwhelmingly the product of external shocks...
Without the heavy post-1978 external blows or, given 
those blows, with adequate international buffers 
against them, the majority of African economies would 
not be sliding backward as they are now doing....
- G. K. Helleiner, 1984c
We must look our mistakes in the face if we are to 
avoid repeating them.
- Mozambique Finance MinisterI
Rui Baltasar
We seem at present to be backing into the future one 
crisis at a time.
- G. K. Helleiner, 1984a 
Economic Malaise in SSA: Does the IMF Matter?
The IMF has become a major factor in SSA external economic negotiations and 
domestic strategy formulations. Without its "seal of approval" expanded World 
Bank and bilateral programmes and significant debt reschedulings do not 
happen. Without additional liquidity and import capacity stabilisation and 
consolidation let alone rehabilitation and recovery do not happen either.
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SSA has become a quicksand swallowing up IMF programmes (and protracted 
unsuccessful negotiations toward programmes) with, in most cases, little to 
show for them in terms of either IMF or country targets and goals. The IMF 
and some of its prescriptions have become major figures in African economic 
demonology. Just as the absence of adequate liquidity and import capacity 
are, or are in danger of, paralysing most SSA economies so too do dialogues of 
the deaf about IMF packages - usually in extremely reductionist terms on both 
sides - paralyse policy making and implementation in a number of SSA 
economies.
For whatever reasons, the IMF-SSA interaction is rarely serving either the 
purposes for which the IMF was founded (see Annex) or the goals of SSA 
governments. However one divides responsibility and however one judges 
varying analyses and perceptions, it is hard to reject the general
applicability of John Williamson's comment on the Tanzania -IMF case
(Williamson, 1983, P 652) "The resulting perpetuation of a tragedy does not 
reflect credit on any of the parties."
The critique which follows concentrates primarily on the IMF's strategies and
tactics as applied in SSA not on national policies and responses as such which
is not to be taken to imply blanket approval of the latter nor, indeed, that
some of them have not been objectively unsound, IMF or no IMF. It - and its
explicit or implicit suggestions for change - are within the broad context of
the IMF’s as set out in Article 1 of its Articles of Agreement (see Annex).
In the context of SSA it starts from the present position of deterioration or
even disintegration of a majority of economies and assumes that the maximum
now possible are limited reforms to halt further deterioration and win limited 
2gains not total systemic restructuring of the IMF and the international 
•3monetary system. A general examination at SSA level is followed by an
examination of the same points in Tanzania-IMF relations as an illustrative 
4case study.
It is necessary to seek to make two distinctions:
a. between the costs of adjustment and the costs of IMF approaches to 
adjustment since external economic environment deterioration which is 
unlikely to be reversed or reversible in the medium term (just as 
much as unsound domestic policies) does require adjustment and
*J
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adjustraent by whatever route entails costs (de Laroisiere, 1984; 
Stewart, 1984). The real questions are whether IMF approaches entail 
avoidable, additional costs (Helleiner, 1983b, 1984c, Stewart, 1984; 
Green in Williamson, 1983) and whether they do in fact stabilise in 
any meaningful sense (as the findings of Killick 1984 and Loxley 1984 
suggest they do not);
b. between the positions and actions of the IMF as an institution (or of 
its staff collectively) and the constraints imposed on it by its 
dominant industrial economy members. It is clearly arguable that the 
IMF’s approaches would work better - or less badly - with higher 
ceiling levels of liquidity (low conditionality facilities) and with 
longer maximum drawing and repayment periods and that the bottom line 
preventing evolution in this direction by the Fund is the position of 
its dominant members - especially the USA but also Federal Germany 
and the UK.^
71970-1984: Backdrop To Contiunuing Crises
Over 1970-73 SSA grew slowly absolutely and relative to the 1960's. Over 
1973-74 it was the hardest hit of the world's regions by interacting grain 
price/drought, energy price and general terms of trade shocks. However, in a 
majority of cases unsuccessful adjustment and recovery was achieved (Dell and 
Lawrence, 1980; Dell, Lawrence, Helleiner, 1983-4; Griffith-Jones, Harvey, 
Seers, 1985; Green, Rwegasira, Van Arkadie, 1981; Bank of Tanzania, 1984).
Over 1976-7 9, taken as a group, SSA economies grew about 6% a year according 
to the standard UN GDP reporting statistics. This was well above their own 
historic trend and above that period's developing country average. As the 
data are constant price, the primary impact of 1975-77 export of price 
improvement has been stripped out - what remains is the dramatic impact of 
import capacity fluctuations on SSA production (see also Helleiner, 1984b; 
Kadhani and Green, 1985). The lagged response of growth to external balance 
decline - still high in 1979 when the current account deficit was already 
skyrocketing and moderate in 198O when the external account crisis was already 
well established - in fact reinforces the import capacity/capacity 
utilisation/growth relationship because physical import cuts did not become
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gener-al until 1981 or near ubiquitous until 1982 (World Bank, 1984a).
Over 1979-81 many SSA governments attempted to adjust on lines analogous to 
those they had pursued successfully over 1974-76. As the then OECD - Bank - 
Fund consensus was that recovery would come in 1981, this, however unwise ex
g
post, was not irrational ex ante. However, it has now left African economies 
the most heaily indebted in the world relative to GDP and with the highest 
debt service to exports ratio of any group of economies (Commonwealth, 1984; 
Griffith-Jones and Green, 1984; Helleiner, 1984c, Table 2) and with a total 
external debt including arrears, short term commercial bank credit and IMF 
drawings as well as the standard official credits/medium and long term bank 
borrowing listings of the order of $200,000 million (Griffith-Jones and Green, 
1984). Further, this situation is worsening rapidly with net inflows (less 
interest and repayment) likely on present trends to drop 602 fom $13,000 to 
$5,000 million net a year by the end of the decade (World Bank, 1984a).
Equally, over 1979-84 access both to liquidity (low conditionality) and 
bridging finance (high conditionality) has been less available relative to 
external shock caused imbalances than was true over 1974-76 and in particular 
less available to those poor economies with limited to negligible access to 
commercial bank credit for whom the IMF is in fact the lender of first - and
Qoften almost only - resort so far as liquidity and bridging finance are 
concerned (Helleiner, 1983a, b; 1984c).
The IMF in SSA: Areas of Debate
The recent history of IMF negotiations and programmes in SSA - and of debates 
on them - suggest -that the major issues can be grouped in eight clusters:
1. Ideological - the Fund as Friedman or Hayekian prophet or as defender
of objective scientific eocnomic analysis;
2. Strategies - the appropriateness, or otherwise, of the Fund’s basic
analysis of the causation of SSA's continuing economic malaise as
excessive increases in real resource utilisation and its 
(consequential) commitment to rapid resource use cutbacks as an 
appropriate way to rapid stabilisation;
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3• Flexibility - the willingness, or otherwise, of the Fund to evaluate
alternative adjustment packages, instruments and phasings to its own 
proposals and to recognise that different causes of imbalance may 
make significantly different instruments and timings appropriate in 
different countries;
4. Equal Treatment - do Fund quotas based on uniform ratios to selected 
economic indicators provide equal treatment or do they in fact 
discriminate against poor, high vulnerability to external shock, 
limited access to alternative short term finance economies like 
virtually all those of SSA?
5. Appropriateness of Criteria - whether IMF targets ("trigger clauses") 
are good measures of performance and whether fixed points or 
ranges/adjustable goals should be set;
6. Technical Competence and Tactics - how adequate IMF projections and 
calculations are, how qualified Fund Missions to Africa are, how 
authoritarian IMF negotiators are and are seen to be;
7. Protection of Vulnerable Groups - whether the IMF's prescriptions do 
in practive weigh particularly heavily on vulnerable groups and 
whether it accepts attempts to limit such impact as a valid component 
of government stabilisation proposals;
8. Adequacy - whether IMF programmes have been of a size, with a 
promptness, over a time span and linked to other external resource 
inflow generation in a way consistent with restoring external balance 
and laying a foundation for sustainable growth.
Is the IMF an Ideological Watchdog?
The IMF was created as the international financial adjustment mechanism for
the rebuilt world capitalist external payments system. Further because world
trade and payments are dominantly capitalist in form and substance (even among
socialist economies), adjustment to external shocks is not and cannot be
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totally different for capitalist and socialist economies. To that extent the 
IMF is capitalist and can hardly avoid being so.
More particularly the IMF is opposed to controls on trade and payments and to 
10price management both externally and domestically. It has a distinct 
preference for the use of market instruments (e.g. exchange rates, grower 
price, interest rates) with as little state '’interference" as possible. This 
is ultimately an ideological preference if an ideology is defined as a 
paradigm or weltanschaung forming a framework within perceived reality.
Certainly the IMF seems to underestimate the imperfections and limitations of 
markets especially under conditions of fragmentation, inflexibility and 
extreme shortages of quite specific real items (as opposed to macro monetary 
aggregates). That in itself is probably a result of its ideological 
perception but is not in itself ideological.
The combined effect of these factors is to make negotiation tedious and 
dialogue largely of the deaf in respect to those African governments who seek 
to use multi-instrument packages including significant non-price allocative 
instruments - ironically especially so if their economies are not socialist."'"'
The IMF is not in any rigorous sense monetarist. It _is oriented to control
(reduction) of demand by control of macro-monetary aggregates with supply
expansion seen as coming later via price incentive motivated increases in
productive investment and exports. That approach may be inappropriate in
respect to many economies but is neither monetarist in the Friedmanite sense
nor ideological per se. Certainly the Fund does not subscribe to the Hayekian
true believer theorem that free markets make free men - if for no other reason
because freedom (apart from that of markets) is simply not on its agenda.
Indeed, IMF officials accept, in private at least and in more guarded terms in
public (e.g. Finch in Williamson 1983) that the price of accepting and acting
on IMF programmes is very likely to be loss of office via electoral or other
methods and that its programmes are probably particularly difficult for
12democratic, publically accountable governments to accept and to implement.
In a negative sense the IMF is ideological in showing to date little or no 
operational (as opposed to very general high level verbal) concern with the
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impact of its programmes on vulnerable groups or how they could be shielded. 
This topic is discussed in greater detail below.
This review suggests that ideology is not the main barrier to negotiating 
workable stabilisation programmes with the IMF; an irritant yes, a primary 
cause of deadlock rarely if ever. Certainly it does not support conspiracy 
theories positing the IMF’s chief goal as undermining populist, welfarist or 
socialist states in the interests of some amorphous world capitalist 
conspiracy or more closely defined emanations thereof. The translation of the 
debate to the ideological level by some IMF critics and proponents (and on 
occasion by some Fund mission members) makes a largely negative contribution 
to understanding the issues at stake or how they might be resolved.
Overheating and Imbalance - Is the IMF Model a Muddle?
For Africa, especially since 1979, this model simply does not fit. Reduction 
of supply (and particularly of physical import supply and real government 
revenue and of domestic food availability in a majority of cases) not 
increases in real resource use set off the negative spiral. Even in these 
cases - e.g. Zimbabwe 1980—81 - in which overheating did play a significant 
role, adjustment by 1984 had usually gone far enough to have minimized the 
domestic policy contribution to imbalance (cf. Kadhani and Green, 1985).
Inflexibility not flexibility and fragmentation not articulation remain the
hallmarks of African economies. Sharp shifts of goods from domestic use to,
or sharp increases in utilisation of idle capacity for, export are not
practicable in the way they are in Italy or Portugal or Turkey where fairly
diversified industrial exports are a relatively large proportion of total 
18exports. The actual basic unprocessed commodity export volumes often cannot
respond sharply and promptly to price incentives alone and if they did in all
or most SSA economies, this would reduce net export earnings because of the
14inelastic demand curves they face.
The standard IMF model posits a need for increased domestic savings and fixed
investment. As applied recently in SSA almost the whole emphasis is on
15raising domestic savings (via cutting government financing requirements , 
freeing prices and raising interest rates) presumably because present gross
fixed capital formation levels already exceed domestic savings by 50 to 1502 
in many SSA states.
Whether raising domestic savings is practicable is unclear. With earned 
import capacity (export earnings) at or below operating import levels and 
these already 25 to 502 below the levels needed to maintain and operate 
existing core production and infrastructure capacity, ex post domestic savings 
cannot exceed the domestic content of fixed investment. This (allowing for 
indirect as well as direct imports) seems to be in the 25 to 502 range. In 
many SSA economies - e.g. Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast - domestic savings 
in the past few years do seem to be at these levels. They can therefore not 
be increased absolutely except by expanding exports or increasing the 
complementary external finance. Increasing them relative to GDP by reducing 
GDP is possible, but hardly a contribution to adjustment or consolidation.
More fixed investment is probably not a priority. With arrears of 
maintenance, general underutilisation of capacity and a higher import ratio to 
fixed investment than that pertaining to other components of GDP (so that a 
fixed investment increase ceterius paribus increases capacity growth but 
reduces achievable GDP levels)^ the case for a generalised increase in fixed 
investment until adjustment, consolidation and rehabilitation are achieved is 
very hard to make.
However, there is a strong case for altering the composition (and quite 
possibly reducing total volume of) fixed investment toward: rehabilitation and 
maintenance, export and import substitution (especially in respect to existing 
food, energy, agricultural imputs, and basic incentive goods imports) and 
bottleneck breaking (e.g. energy and personpower development). This is no 
longer, as it was when the author first advanced it in 1980, an eccentric 
position; it is now approaching conventional wisdom status (e.g. World Bank, 
1984). The IMF’s macro monetary model because of its aggregation and its 
limited attention to real (as opposed to monetary) elements does not and 
cannot provide much insite into such micro and sectoral real issues in 
investment any more than in production. It has not, in fact, been 
supplemented by serious real side analysis nor married to the World Bank's 
structural adjustment approach which arguably relates more directly and 
relevantly to SSA stabilisation and consolidation as well as rehabilitation 
and renewed growth issues.^
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The case for reducing or eliminating recurrent budget deficits is much 
stronger. Whether they reduce total private and public savings or not, they 
do tend to be inflationary and to reduce fiscal control by removing a 
reasonable, definable rule - recurrent expenditure covered by recurrent 
revenue. Where the basic cause of the deficit is falls in real government 
revenue, the initial assumption would seem to be that restoration of balance 
should be primarily by restoration of real revenue levels - a presumption the 
IMF does not reject. Where it is caused by sudden and massive increases in 
production or consumption subsidies, the first step should be to analyse why 
these have been raised and whether price adjustments - eg devaluation - could 
significantly reduce them and at what real cost. The IMF does agree with this 
approach albeit it is not willing to accept that in many SSA economies the 
only likely short run gain from devaluation is improved recurrent budget 
balance.
The lumping of the investment finance requirement with the recurrent deficit 
is analytically unsatisfactory. This is especially true when no account is 
taken of actual uses or of sources of finance. Borrowing for investment by a 
government or a firm may or may not be prudent and certain sources may be 
appropriate or inappropriate but the ratio of borrowing to turnover or EDP is 
not, by itself, a very good test of either. Much more detailed analysis is 
needed for such testing.
The problem with restoring real revenue levels as a means to restoring 
recurrent budget balance is that the falls usually relate to reduced import 
capacity - directly and (often dominantly) via impact on partially import 
dependent domestic manufacturing and on company profits which are often major 
sources of sales and of income tax revenue. Thus, real revenue falls are a 
symptom of falls in earned import capacity not offset by increased access to 
liquidity and bridging finance. As such their cure (by financing at least 
interim restoration of real import levels) would logically seem to be one of 
the targets to be included in Fund Programmes for most SSA economies. 
However, although the Fund does not in general reject this explanation of real 
revenue falls, it does not seem to see reversing them as a significant 
component of Programme goals.
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Flexibility: Adapting to Actualities and Alternatives
IMF Missions to SSA countries have not adapted their model significantly in
respect to varying economic structures, their prescriptions in response to
diverse eocnomic situations and causal patterns of imbalance or their proposed
instruments and timing in relation to either. (For a similar conclusion more
18generally see Killick, 1984a, 1984b). The case that imbalances resulting
from loss of purchasing power through exogenous shocks require different - and 
probably real supply restoration not macro monetary contraction biased - 
adjustment from those caused by standard domestic overheating or that 
structural parameters limit what types of programme are feasible and effective 
in ways which both make SSA eocnomies unlike those of the upper middle income 
group and imply the need for substantial variation among African programmes. 
Attempts to define alternative adjustment programmes by SSA governments are 
seen as attempts to avoid adjusting.
The resulting "belief that the Fund would not seriously consider alternatives 
to its own package" (Stewart, 1984) leads:
a. to lack of sustained attention to defining such packages;
b. if the IMF package is seen as unacceptable but as a precondition for
external finance, either to fatalism or to somewhat febrile attempts 
to devise packages which might please the IMF but offset the negative 
side effects perceived in its prescription - often with limited 
attention to internal consistency;
c. to a reactive counter dogmatism - especially on any use of prices and
markets to manage the economy and most particularly on devaluation -
which opposes instruments simply or largely because the IMF support 
them with little evaluation of whether they are individually useful 
or even necessary and, if so, how they could be positioned in 
acceptable overall strategies.
Devaluation proposals - usually of about 3 0%, 6 0% or 9 0% (i.e. increasing the
cost of foreign exchange by 42??, 150% or 900*) - are almost ubiquitous and
almost always presented as preconditions or initial year actions with phased
19or delayed exchange rate adjustment seen as inappropriate. The reality that
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massive devaluations do raise inflation and - taken by themselves - generate
nothing as surely as the need for another massive devaluation has been taken
into account by advocacy of small, frequent past - devaluation adjustments to
prevent reappreciation of the real comparative purchasing power exchange
rates. Taken by itself this instrument is much more desirable under SSA
conditions than sticky exchange rates punctuated by sharp devaluation.
However, the logic of combining this type of adjustment to prevent increased
overvaluation with two to three year reversal of previous overvaluation phased
to parallel output increases and cost reductions (on greater capacity
utilisation) gains from the programme thus reducing human and political costs
and reducing the damage of massive shocks to already weak and brittle
20economies is not one the Fund appears willing to consider.
Higher interest rates (irrespective of probable effects on savings or 
inflation), reduced government financing requirements (irrespective of the 
short or long term costs of consequential service or productive investment 
cuts), attempted increase of export producer (and sometimes food producer) 
real incomes and incentives by massive nominal price boosts (without regard to 
whether the producers physically can respond, whether supplies of desired 
goods are adequate to cause the grower price increases to generate anything 
other than broader price increases, whether it is plausible to raise the 
domestic real price of commodities whose global real prices are falling or 
whether the income redistribution implied by raising one substantial group’s 
real incomes while national output per capita is falling are either 
economically plausible, socially acceptable or politically practicable), 
abolition of all consumer subsidies (irrespective of what groups are affected 
how severly or whether the subsidies are a significant fraction of recurrent 
spending) and ’liberalisation” (i.e. substituting high prices for market 
management and allocation by use) of imports (irrespective of probable impact 
on import mix, income distribution and/or production) are almost equally 
ubiquitous proposals. They too are seen as needing to be front end loaded,
i.e. administered as a short sharp shock with most of the costs at once and 
the benefits trickling in later.
There is one major exception to this rule. In an increasing number of SSA 
economies the IMF does accept that present import levels are so low as to 
prevent effective maintenance or reasonable utilisation rates for existing 
capacity. For these economies it is willing to prescribe delayed import
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liberalisation because it accepts that further import reduction could be 
counterproductive and that at import levels attainable in the short term 
market mechanisms would not ’clear” well.
This distinct lack of flexibility ignores four facts:
1. the basic cause (initially and even more today) of SSA’s economic 
decline is loss of import capacity not expansion of resource 
utilisation;
2. in that context policy reforms - especially on the price side - can 
yield results and be sustained only if substantial additional 
external resources are made available on a phasing which puts 
benefits in step with costs (e.g. World Bank, 1984a);
3. differential performance by SSA economies through 1980 was much more 
closely correlated with external economic environment changes than 
with domestic policies (Wheeler, 1984);
4. that while ’’some political and economic pressure may contribute to 
appropriate policy reform; too much, however, when applied to fragile 
administrative and planning systems, is capable of inducing policy 
paralysis" (Helleiner, 1984c) or indeed to a blanket reaction against 
any meaningful policy reform.
Equal Treatment or Negative Discrimination?
The IMF contends that its conditions and quotas are applied and computed 
uniformly. In a formal sense this is largely - though not totally - correct 
but perhaps in a way similar to Anatole France’s comment that the law equally 
forbad rich and poor alike sleeping under bridges. The goals of the IMF can 
reasonably read in terms of providing equally effective access to liquidity 
and bridging finance to all members in proportion to the size of their 
adjustment requirements (especially those initially caused by external shocks) 
not financable by other means. Equal treatment in that sense is not available 
to SSA or other poor economies.
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The uniformity of treatment would require taking account of:
1 . differential availability of alternative sources of liquidity (e.g. 
being a reserve currency issuer, participation in swop arrangements, 
access to commercial bank finance) - with an offsetting positive 
discrimination in favour of economies ill placed in this respect;
2 . size of exogenous shocks (e.g. weather, terms of trade shifts, 
negative export volume shifts on demand/protection side) relative to 
balance of payments - with quotas or at any rate access to Fund 
reserves related positively to vulnerability to shocks;
3 * capacity to adjust rapidly - with greater access and longer repayment
in respect to economies with limited flexibility and resource
reallocability.
These criteria all suggest greater than standard access to IMF resources and 
longer than averge repayment periods for SSA economies as a group and for all 
but a handful considered individually.
In fact the IMF has no such provisions either in quota levels, eligibility to 
draw or actual levels of drawings programmed. Quite the reverse and
increasingly the reverse. The poor economies are excluded from the use of
General Agreement to Borrow and Saudi loan resources; the Compensatory Finance
Facility has been converted from low to high conditionality; quota increases 
in 1983 (at least for poor economies) were virtually or even more than offset 
by cuts in ceiling percentages of quota to be drawn annually, in a programme 
or overall; the Trust Fund loans and interest subsidies initiated in response 
to 1 9 7 3 - 7 4 shocks has been wound up as has the complementary low
conditionality oil facility; the 1 9 8 0 - 8 1 swing toward larger and longer 
programmes under the Extended Fund Facility aegis has, at least for SSA, been 
reversed dramatically (Helleiner, 1984c).
At the end of 19 81 25.8$ of outstanding IMF credits and 47.1$ of total
commitments were to low income ($3 00 or less per capita in 1978 prices)
countries and a total of 5 5 .8$ of outstandings and 66.7$ of commitments to
lowand lower middle income (up to $699 per capita) economies, (de Vries, and 
Porzecanski in Williamson, 1983, pp 68-9). By July 31, 1984 low income (under
i ' *
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$410 per capita 1982 prices) outstandings were* 9*1$ and commitments 8% and low 
plus lower middle (to $ 1680 per capita) were 2 0 .5% of outstandings and 23.4^ 
of commitments (IMF, 1984b).
Similarly actual standby and extended arrangements (excluding EFF which would 
increase the bias) average 80^ of quota for low income and middle income 
countries with drawings (27 of 84) and 109% for upper middle income countries 
with drawings (9 of 25). (Calculated from Helleiner, 1984c, Tables 5 and 6).
Within low (12 of 14) and lower middle income (7 of 13) countries SSA 
arangements averaged about or slightly below the overall average - there are 
no SSA cases of upper middle income drawings.
Therefore in practice low and lower middle income countries, including those 
of SSA, while needing preferential access in relation to quota sizes as now 
defined, actually have had falling access relative to total Fund outstandings 
and commitments and have been able to arrange to draw less relative to quotas 
than upper middle income countries.
How Appropriate Are The IMF’s Criteria?
IMF programme criteria - in general and in SSA - are almost all macro 
monetary, e.g. exchange rates (devluations), levels of external borrowing, 
ceilings on domestic credit formation overall and with respect to the 
government, interest rates (floors), wages (ceilings), grower prices (floors), 
external commercial payment and debt arrears (minimum reductions). It is true 
that other targets - e.g. GDP, external finance inflows, export growth - are 
frequently included in letters of intent, often at the instance of the 
government, but they are in a real sense peripheral. The criteria - unlike 
other targets - are set out with definite required levels ("trigger clauses" 
failure to meet which causes suspension or renegotiation of the programme) to 
be met quarter by quarter.
This approach is open to criticism on at least six counts (cf. Chapters 22, 24 
in Williamson 1983; Commonwealth 1983; Group of 24, 1982; Green 1984a):
as criteria they are too numerous, e.g. a single target (or target
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range) for Current Account Deficit would serve as well as a 
control/review device and would provide more flexibility for 
alternative national programme development;
2. they are all macro or sectoral monetary and tend to abstract from 
both constraints on and changes in the micro and sectoral real 
economy;
3. most relate to inputs not outputs, e.g. not to growth of output,
21import capacity, export earnings or real government revenue;
4. little or no acount is taken of sectoral or distributional impact;
5. point criteria' levels - as opposed to ranges - are inappropriate 
given the levels of uncertainty inevitably surrounding economies as 
poorly documented and as open to exogenous shocks as those of Africa;
6. the absence of built in mechanisms to alter criteria if, despite full
performance on the government policy or practice side, exogenous
events, inadequate initial data or failure of the economy to respond,
falsify the anticipated results or clearly positive overall movement
22is too slow to meet one or more criteria.
Technical Expertise, Negotiating Skill and External Imposition
The lack of success of IMF programmes in Africa in their own terms (Loxley, 
1984) and the substantial average errors in many projections raise questions 
not simply as to the adequacy of the IMF model but also as to its global 
economic projections to the extent they provide the external economic 
environment frame for the country projections and also as to the competence of 
country missions in digging out, evaluating and interpreting the (admittedly 
incomplete and often poor quality2 )^ SSA country data. The fact that national 
teams are also often weak is not a defence - the picture of IMF teams of 
limited ability and little real grasp of the national economy dealing with 
limited (in numbers, training, experience and data base) national teams 
(Helleiner, 1983b) is hardly a reassuring one.
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Missions seem particularly 'unlucky* in estimating pipeline current payments 
requirements and seasonal credit requirement patterns. This is crucial 
because 'conservative' (i.e. too low) estimates lead to early trigger clause 
levels not being met and the programme collapsing, not because of government 
inaction nor because end of year targets were unattainable, but because data 
had been treated as a topic for confrontational negotiation not attempts at 
mutual estimation, let alone for range targets when the mutual agreement was 
on how uncertain the projections were.
For example if an SSA country issues export licenses valid for six months and 
pays for imports primarily by 90 to 180 day letters of credit and open book 
credit, then an import license/import forex authorisation cut will take 6 to 9 
months to reduce deliveries (recorded physical imports) to the new target 
levels and 12 to 18 to reduce import payment requirements to them even if 
carried out in full immediately. If finance to cover the pipeline is not 
"front end loaded" there will be an increase in arrears which will both cause 
a withdrawal of new trade credit (in practice substituting arrears for normal 
trade credit in the external balance sheet) and a sharp country specific 
increase in the unit cost of imports. IMF missions appear not to grasp these 
institutional and flow realities and to assume discussions based on them are 
uniformly (as on occasion they may be) attempts to evade import management 
rather than to estimate and provide for the short term payments requirements 
resulting from past transactions.
A similar problem arises if both government and enterprise sector bank 
borrowing have seasonal patterns which lead to higher domestic credit 
formation growth in the quarters which happen to come first in the IMF standby 
year. Again IMF personnel tend to wish to negotiate the seasonal pattern not 
to estimate it - a process remarkably likely to cause a false triggering of 
programme suspension.
The IMF's pattern of insisting on "front end loading" putting costs at the 
beginning and benefits later and the related "short, sharp shock" appraoch 
delay country's approaching the Fund until the situation is desparate and 
further delay and embitter negotiations.
The parallel failure of the Fund to favour parallel negotiations with the Bank
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(for structural adjustment or sectoral programmes) and bilateral sources (for 
import support and debt rescheduling) clearly endangers the viability of the 
programmes since they are usually dependent on significant increases in net 
external resource inflows - and quick ones at that if the early quarterly 
"trigger clauses" are not to be pulled.
Further the habit of many IMF Missions to combine pontification on issues well 
beyond those actually under negotiation (on occasion with only the sketchiest 
notion of what the structural, institutional, policy or procedural realities 
of the country are); to make what appear to be "take it or leave it offers" 
and/or when negotiating to be remarkably and (apparently) deliberately 
imprecise about what would be acceptable as well as suddenly reopening points 
on which agreement had apparently been reached, can hardly be said to 
contribute either to relations of mutual trust or personal rapport with would 
be borrowers or to an orderly, prompt negotiating process.
The Fund's missions tend to imply that they exercise 'reverse linkage', i.e. 
deter other lenders when unable to conclude a programme agreement. In fact - 
except for World Bank SAL’s for which an operative higher credit tranche fund 
agreement is a precondition - 'reverse linkage’ probably does not consist 
primarily or even significantly of Fund lobbying so much as of a 'follow the 
leader' policy on the part of many bilateral sources combined with the fact 
that an SSA country seeking but unable to secure a Fund agreement normally has 
commercial and debt arrears, a massive current account deficit and a visibly 
deteriorating economy all of which do deter providers of concessional and 
commercial finance, IMF or no IMF. However, the 'reverse linkage' overtones 
do tend to be interpreted as an IMF conspiracy against non-agreeing countries 
and can poison Fund-country relations and negotiations; to that extent they 
are a serious negotiating blunder.
A more serious tactical or even strategic mistake relates to the relative 
roles of the Fund and Bank in SSA adjustment programmes. The SSA adjustment 
programmes:
a. require micro and macro real economy structural, institutional policy 
and preformance expertise to be effective;
are in a much more rigid and fragmented context than applies in most
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Latin American, Asian or South European economies;
c. need to be over a longer time period because of the limits to rapid
response arising from the first two characteristics, and
d. for at least the poor and many of the lower middle income economies
require both larger bridging/arrears clearing/capacity utilisation 
support finance and a higher proportion of concessional finance than 
is possible within Fund parameters.
All of these are problems with which the Bank is far better able to grapple 
than the Fund - quite apart from the fact that its working relations with most 
SSA governments are both closer and less tense than those with the Fund. 
Therefore in respect to negotiating SSA stabilisation and adjustment
programmes Bank not Fund leadership (or at least genuinely joint programme 
negotiation and missions) would appear appropriate.
This might also overcome another mixed problem of appearances and realities. 
The Fund gives the impression that it imposes programmes and that the formal 
drafting of a "letter of intent" by a country is done at the Fund's figurative 
or literal dictation from a pre-written Fund draft, at least in so far as the 
key commitments and trigger clauses go. This may have its uses in making the 
Fund a lightning rod for internal objections to the policy package (and is 
often exploited in this way domestically) but it has a very high cost. As G.
K. Helleiner has succinctly observed (1984c):
Effective stabilisation and adjustment programmes require 
that the governments concerned regard them as "their own."
Imposed programmes do not hold.
The Bank - whatever its tendencies to view itself as a band of Platonic 
Guardians and its implication that it will concentrate its SSA resources on a 
a minority of economies chosen on the Bank's evaluation of their policies - is 
aware of the need to negotiate and to convince so that governments believe in 
and feel committed to the programmes they adopt (Bank, 1984a) in a way the 
Fund apparently is not.
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Vulnerable Groups - Obstacles to Efficiency or Human Victims?
The IMF has been criticised frequently - and sometimes brutally - for ignoring 
the impact of its policy prescriptions (and of macro monetary market price 
oriented approaches in general) on poor and vulnerable groups (Green, 1984b). 
Its response (e.g. de Laroisiere, 1984) is two fold:
1. the cost of adjustment is being confused with the costs and gains of 
Fund programmes;
2. countries are free to choose whatever specific cuts in public 
expenditure and other specific policies to protect vulnerable groups 
they prefer so long as they do have a package of adjustment measures 
and of macro targets which is plausible and operational. Thus if the 
vulnerable and poor are shoved aside it is the national governments’ 
fault not the IMF’s.
There is something in each of these points. In SSA vulnerable groups include 
peasants (and pastoralists) on sub-marginal holdings (either as to size or 
ecology), a substantial proportion of other small peasants (whose ability to 
produce is low), natural disaster victims, refugees, minimum wage and informal 
sector employees/self employed and - within households which are below or just 
above the poverty or vulnerability line - women and children (see Jolly and 
Cornia 1984 and particular chapter by Singer and Green). Because these add up 
to well over 50* of the total human beings in SSA - by some definitions in 
some states one could reach 90% - it is impracticable to place all of the 
costs of adjustment on the less vulnerable and less poor.
Similarly it is true to say that the IMF does not directly call for policy
changes and resource reallocations designed to hit the poor and vulnerable
particularly hard and that many SSA governments’ do not appear to show much,
if any, "revealed preference" toward shielding or assisting such groups of 
people, IMF or no IMF.
However, this answer is at best incomplete and at worst grossly misleading:
a. the IMF - and especially IMF missions - are not sensitive to the poor 
and vulnerable, indeed they are more often than not de facto
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’invisible’ to them;
b. purely production oriented strategies are likely to exclude many of 
the poor and vulnerable (as underlined in World Bank, 1984a) unless 
creative priority attention is given to developing low cost basic 
service and income enhancement policies biased toward them (ibid);
c. reducing real wages across the board (a recurrent IMF requirement, in 
fact if not always explicitly) does hit poor minimum wage and 
informal sector members hard while grower price increases - while 
they may assist some vulnerable groups in some countries - do little 
for the poorest rural groups and worsen the position of poor urban 
residents;
d. cutting government recurrent spending (especially if pure 
administration, military expenditure and national celebrations are 
not specifically cited as priority areas for cuts) does tend to 
result in disproportionate cuts in education, health and pure water 
recurrent spending which in turn has a particularly severe impact on 
basic level low income urban and rural area provision of these 
services (cf. UNICEF, 1984);
e. the IMF in practice objects on principle (not simply in the context
of overall fiscal policy) to almost all instruments to benefit or
protect the poor and vulnerable from food subsidies and massive
drought relief (even if in a ’food for work” form) programmes through
broad access to basic health education and water at nil or low fees
to targeted projects to assist specific groups or areas and does not
suggest or engage in discussion of what alternative instruments might
24in a particular context be more ’cost efficient.”
f. the IMF neither seeks to study the impact of its programmes ex post 
or ex ante on poor and vulnerable groups itself nor makes use of the 
expertise of other agencies - e.g. ILO, UNICEF, national governments 
to do so;
g. poor and vulnerable groups are particularly susceptible to exogenous 
shocks, close to survival or absolute poverty levels to start and 
usually with limited capacity to adjust rapidly on their own and
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therefore are likely to suffer disproportionately from "front end
loading" and "short sharp shock" approaches;
h. those SSA governments which have sought to shelter vulnerable and
increase access to basic services and to income generating activities 
for poor people have, in practice, consistently perceived IMF
programme conditions as obstacles (or their commitment to such
measures as obstacles to agreeing or sustaining IMF programmes).
To What End? Adequacy and All That
There has been a tendency to merge liquidity and bridging finance requirements 
with those for development finance or, alternatively formulated, the 
cyclical/shock current account deficit with the trend/structural. While
potentially useful for overall balance of payments management or for calling 
attention to total external transfer requirements this approach has certain 
disadvantages:
a. the two deficits are conceptually different;
b. maintaining or trying to maintain the fixed investment levels
consistent with 5 to 6% growth and approximate external balance on 
basic account has worsened capacity utilisation problems;
c. there is a respectable case for IMF - World Bank - bilateral 
stabilisation funding (drawings, import support, part of
rehabilitation and structural adjustment programmes) to be
calculated, negotiated and managed with a degree of separation from 
(as well as coordination with) external resource flows for long term 
investment;
d. given both the articles of the IMF and the climate of northern
opinion at both governmental and public levels the conflation is more 
likely to reduce than to increase total resource inflows (cf.
Helleiner, 1984c) and to perpetuate the combination of excessive
finance for new projects which objectively cannot be utilized or 
maintained except by reducing ’ already inadequate maintenance and
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utilisation of existing capacity with very severe underprovision of 
maintenance and capacity utilisation import support finance to bridge 
adjustments in trade and production/resource use structures.
Therefore, this critique of adequacy relates to liguidity (low conditionality
IMF and analagous Bank or bilateral facilities) and bridging finance (high
conditionality facilities). The chief purposes of such finance - both in
terms of the IMF’s Articles and of most versions of economic logic - is to
offset the impact of exogenous shocks which are likely to be self reversing or
rapidly reversible and to provide time in which adjustment can be made to
permanent negative changes in the external economic environment and/or in
which the consequences of erroneous domestic policy decisons can be 
25reversed. That is, in the first type of case liquidity/bridging finance
would finance holding on until the negative shock reversed itself while in the
second it would be tapered down in phase with some reasonable period for 
achieving adjustment (cf. Williamson, 19 8 3, P 657-8).
Cumulative terms of trade deterioration for low income countries other than 
India or China probably totalled $12,500 million over 1979-83 measured against 
a 1979 base or $2 7 , 5 0 0 million over 1 9 7 8 - 8 2 measured against a 19 77 base 
(rough estimate from IMF 1984a, cf. Helleiner 1984c). Net IMF credit was 
$3,700 million over 1979-83 (IMF, 1984a, p 204) or barely 30$ of the lower and 
1 2 .5$ of the higher estimate of the cost of terms of trade deterioration
above.
Adding on the impact of slower volume growth in world trade, interest rate 
increases and natural disasters would increase the external shock losses 
substantially. Adding on Stabex and bilateral donor increases in balance of 
payments (operating and import support) assistance would increase moderately 
the adjustment finance supplied. As three quarters of the IMF credits were 
high conditionality it is very difficult to estimate the quasi automatic 
(liquidity) element of adjustmentfinance at over 10$ of the post 1978 or 5$ of 
the post 19 7 7 shock impact (cf. Helleiner, 1984c). Liquidity and high
conditionality adjustment finance together can hardly have exceeded 2 0$ and 
10$ respectively.
The absolute sums for SSA would be different - some low income countries are 
not in SSA and a number of SSA economies are lower, middle income, usually
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with the stress on lower - but the proportion of adjustment finance to shocks 
would not be very different.
Thus there is a very overall strong case that IMF and other adjustment finance 
has been inadequate in volume. Country experience seems to bear this out - 
even the showpiece Bank-Fund-Bilateral country programmes such as Sudan, 
Uganda and Ghana appear to be severely constrained to date and their medium 
term viability threatened by inadequate bridging finance.
There is also a quality problem. Conditional finance is not liquidity because
it is not available automatically, rapidly and at a predictable date
(especially given the actual relaxed time frame within which the IMF conducts
high conditionality negotiations if there is any significant divergence
between its proposed package and what the would be borrower is willing to
26accept or counterproposes.) Especially for finance to avoid unnecessary 
adjustment to shocks likely to be reversed and to give time to start an 
adjustment programme in respect to other shocks and domestic policy mistakes, 
liquidity is vital.
Over 1979-84 the situation in respect to IMF access in relation to needs has 
worsened for SSA both quantitatively and qualitatively. Quota increases have 
been virtually cross cancelled by reductions in ceiling ratios of drawings to 
quotas. The CFF has not been expanded or linked to interim maintenance of 
real import capacity rather than trend nominal export receipts, instead it has 
been shifted from low to high conditionality. No new low conditionality 
facilities analagous to the Trust Fund, interest subsdidy and oil facilities 
have been established. The retreat from the EFF has shortened horizons as to 
assured financing for adjustments and reduced repayment periods forcing more 
rapid adjustment. All of these would appear to be changes in the wrong
direction.
The IMF as an institution might well agree that it needed more finance to 
extend larger and perhaps longer term adjustment facilities (albeit not on the 
need for a higher proportion of low conditionality ones) and argue that it was 
constrained by its dominant industrial economies' positions. Two comments
pertain to this:
the IMF has not been at all forceful in pressing the case for much
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larger expansion of its resources than has taken place let alone in 
respect to differentially improved access for poor and vulnerable 
countries;
2. it has not for low and lower middle income countries sought to use 
its ’seal of approval” to provide additional adjustment finance in a 
manner analagous to its mobilizing (virtually coercing) additional 
commercial bank finance to augment major upper middle income borrower 
programmes.
The latter point is of considerable importance. If IMF resources are 
inadequate to finance adjustment and cannot readily be augmented, the logical 
first response by the IMF is not to cut down adjustment programme size or
timing but to seek to mobilize World Bank (SAL, sectoral) and bilateral 
(operating and maintenance import support, debt rescheduling) finance to make 
the resources fit the programme. With the very partial (both in terms of
effort, promptness and overall adequacay of funding secured) exceptions of 
Uganda, Sudan and Ghana it does not appear to have done so.
Global Good Housekeeping or Fallacy of Composition?
One criticism of the IMF that has not surfaced frequently in the SSA context 
but has elsewhere (e.g. Commonwealth, 1983) is that it is following a cyclical 
rather than a counter cyclical pattern and that its national adjustment 
programmes - however appropriate when viewed one at a time - when aggregated 
are likely to depress global growth of international trade and production and
to raise levels of unemployment and the advance of the "new protectionism".
This is a particularly telling criticism, if valid, as it would suggest that 
the IMF has forgotten what it was set up to do: prevent lack of liquidity
leading to predatory trade policies, cumulative competitive devaluations, 
growing physical barriers to trade and continued high levels of capacity 
underutilisation and of unemployment, i.e. what its founders at Bretton Woods 
saw as the institutional and policy patterns of the 1929 international 
financial collapse and 1930's depression. Clearly the IMF has not been 
seeking to achieve such a result, but the record does suggest a surprising 
degree of myopia and fallacy of composition for a global organisation.
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Globally a majority of the world’s economies have historically low levels of
capacity utilisation and growth of GDP combined with historically high levels
of unemployment and Current Discount Deficits. Less uniformly they also have
inflation rates which are low relative to the 1960*s and early 1970's. This
not incidentally, is not a global sketch which corresponds to the IMF model
which sees overheating by excessive increases in resource use as the key
27causal factor of the continuation of their problems.
The IMF prescription in general is for restored international balance and 
growth by raising exports and reducing imports. Its standard time frame for 
such adjustment has been short and over 1981-82 it actually reduced the real 
level of net drawings - especially to poor and lower middle income countries. 
While possible for any one country, it is not possible for all together - one 
economy’s exports are other economies’ imports and attempts by a large number 
to swing their trade balances rapidly (especially in the context of low
capacity utilisation and high unemployment) create a tendency toward
cumulative, cross cancelling devaluations (whose total global impact is 
inflationary by definition) and toward the extension of the ’new 
protectionism’s” non-tariff barriers to international trade.
The implications for SSA are clear - even if they do not form part of IMF-SSA
government negotiations - and also clearly negative:
a. slowing global recovery continues the relative stagnant price and 
volume outlook for SSA traditional exports;
b. continued high capacity underutilisation and unemployment creates a 
situation unfavourably (in both market and intervention respects) to 
diversifying exports by extension of pre-export processing or 
addition of a substantial manufactured goods component in countries 
in which it would be justifiable on technical and normal comparative 
advantage grounds (e.g. hides and skins and cotton exporters in 
respect to pre-export processing, Zimbabwe in respect to 
manufactures);
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c. continued slow growth (and pressure to reduce government borrowing
requirements) in the industrial economies reduces the probable flows
of net external finance on concessionary terms while continued
economic malaise in SSA reduces availability and worsens terms of
commercial finance (as well as making it more frequently too
expensive or short term to use because both GDP and export earnings
28growth are so low).
Tanzania as Example
Tanzania is not - like any other country - a "typical” case. However it has
several features which are relevant to assessing the impact (positive or
negative) of IMF perceptions and programmes in SSA from 1979 onward:
1. It is a low income economy but not a minute one (about 22 million 
people, $4,500 million GDP as of 1984);
2. It is highly vulnerable to - and has been severely affected by
external shocks;
3. The political economic development strategy pursued since 1967 (and 
less coherently since 19 61) has stressed basic needs, vulnerable 
group protection, reduction of external dependence, managed markets 
(as opposed either to "free” markets or material balances planning) 
moderate (5 to 6% a year) growth, rural bias, fiscal and monetary 
conservatism and mass participation in decision taking and 
accountability and a decentralised, phased transition to socialism. - 
a package in many respects likely to lead to different perspectives 
than those of the IMF;
4. through 1978 the strategy was reasonably successful in respect to 
most goals but from 1979 on has been remarkably unsuccessful in 
respect to several - notably growth, external dependence, balanced 
recurrent budgets and low inflation;
5. the 1974-76 adjustment strategy - which made use of substantial IMF 
and World Bank import support resources - was broadly successful
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(except in respect to restoring an export growth - earned import 
capacity - dynamic except in the context of of the 1976-77 beverage 
boom) but attempts to replicate it over 1979-81 were apparently less 
coherently formulated, failed" to secure comparable IMF and Bank 
backing and were consistently overtaken by the worsening 
international and weather and, largely consequential, domestic 
economic environment;
6. negotiations with the IMF - and to a lesser degree the World Bank 
until 1983/4 - have not simply failed to reach agreements that hold 
up but have arguably had consequences for domestic policy debate 
which have delayed the pace of adjustment which would otherwise have 
taken place;
7. the pressure of the political economic crises has both led to a 
deterioration in average quality of domestic analysis and management 
but also forced a shortening of time horizons - for some key areas 
including fuel and foreign exchange literally week to week juggling - 
and created increased uncertainties and reduced ability to control 
results of actions attempted.
8. whatever the causes of the present economic malaise - or the chances 
of "bottoming out” by purely national adjustment actions - no serious 
stabilisation, rehabilitation and adjustment programme can be 
launched without an initial partial restoration of import capacity 
(before exports can be raised significantly).
Two other characteristics admittedly do somewhat tell against Tanzania’s use
as a case study:
1. Tanzanian economic data - while of a broader range than for many SSA 
economies - have deteriorated in quality radically since the late 
1970’s and in respect to GDP and food production are now clearly so 
shaky (and inconsistent) as to hamper and confuse both analysis and 
resolution of disagreed issues;
2. a variety of institutions, viewpoints and individuals - especially 
non-Tanzanian ones - have at various times seen Tanzania as a symbol
-28-
or laboratory case study of what they were committed to or against 
(sometimes of both at different times) with very imperfect 
correlation either with objective reality in Tanzania or with 
(varying) Tanzanian perceptions of what they were seeking to achieve;
3 . at no time since 197^-75 has a durable IMF programme been achieved.
The first problem is hardly unique to Tanzania - the data deficiencies may be 
more generally known because the data has been analysed more rather than 
because it is worse than average SSA data. The second can only be noted and, 
hopefully, guarded against in presentations and interpretations. Long gaps in 
• IMF-state relations in SSA - even in the presence of a demonstrable need for 
adjustment - are by no means uncommon even if the Tanzania case is unusual in 
duration and has a, perhaps uniquely, high public profile. The last point 
cuts two ways as it also means that more information is accessible on 
IMF-Tanzania relations than on almost any other SSA case.
Tanzania - IMF Relations: A Sketch
Until 1974 Tanzania’s relations with the IMF were reasonably mutually 
satisfactory but not particularly intense. Fund missions to members not 
seeking to draw tend to have limited leverage and discussions - even on 
disagreed points of analysis or policy - moderately relaxed. Tanzania’s 
1970-71 external imbalance mini-crisis was resolved by domestic action 
including limited use of SDR’s but no Fund drawings (see Rwegasira, Green, Van 
Arkadie, 19 81).
Over 1 9 7 4 - 7 5 Tanzania made substantial use of Fund resources - the balance of 
its SDR’s, oil and CFF facilities, gold and first credit tranche. All were 
low conditionality. The Fund fairly clearly was sceptical in respect to some 
aspects of the 1 9 7 4 - 7 6 adjustment strategy. This included substantial 
domestic price adjustments, limited devaluation, restraint on recurrent 
spending, protection of minimum wage earner and peasant real incomes and 
access to services, maintenance of investment, increases in exports and use of 
bridging finance to ride out the short term impact and allow time for supply 
enhancement adjustment to restore external and internal balance (see ibid). 
However, because the strategy was at least partially orthodox, the Fund
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accepted that short term shocks did require fairly full initial offsetting 
finance and the drawings used were low conditionality no serious problems of 
negotiation arose.
A 1975 Second Credit Tranche Standby did not become effective because the 
government domestic bank borrowing sub-ceiling was breached (probably for 
seasonal pattern reasons). (Bank of Tanzania, 1984 p. 225). However, as 
Tanzania’s external balance was rapidly improving by late 1975 and earned 
import capacity, imports and reserves rose sharply in 1976 the Standby would 
probably not have been fully drawn in any event. Thus the breakdown did not 
lead either to negotiations to resolve disagreements or to any substantial 
strain on IMF/Tanzania relationships and, indeed, substantial low 
conditionality (CFF and balance of First Credit Tranche) drawings were made in 
1976 and 1977.3°
In 1978 the current account deficit exploded - first as a result of ill 
considered import liberalisation, second from terms of trade deterioration 
and, third from the war costs following the Amin regime’s invasion. Tanzania 
approached the IMF at the beginning of 1979 reaching a First Credit Tranche 
and CFF interim agreement (including a 15* devaluation) in March. However, 
negotiations toward a longer term, Higher Credit Tranche agreement first 
dragged on and then collapsed in open acrimony.
Over April - August 1980 an agreement was reached after hard and intensive but 
reasonably amicable negotiations. Intended to be the first tranche of a three 
year EFF it collapsed after the CFF and first quarterly drawing. Renewed 
negotiations in 1981 , 1982, 1983 and 1984 produced no agreement and, while
the open animosity of 1979 was avoided, increasing doubts as to the IMF’s
seriousness of desire to reach an acceptable agreement and as to the 
practicable possibility of negotiating one became increasingly widespread
among Tanzanian analysts and decision takers.
Ideological Deadlock?
Tanzania's basic disagreements with the IMF - especially in negotiations 
proper - have not been ideological if by that is meant "IMF capitalism versus 
Tanzania transition to socialism". Debates on appropriate types, degrees and
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limitations on liberalisation, market management, state economic intervention
and public enterprise sector economic activity have been intense and frequent
but have not been major causes in the actual deadlocks. The Fund has not
suggested elimination or across the board reduction of the public enterprise 
31sector. Ideological glosses - often very loosely connected to the actual 
content of negotiations or actual alternatives for feasible adjustment - by 
persons associated with both sides have not helped the atmosphere surrounding 
negotiations but have been secondary irritants, causes for delay of 
rationalisations of breakdowns not causes of deadlocks.
The linked issues of absolute poverty eradication and of income distribution 
have certainly been ones on which Tanzania and the Fund have not seen eye to 
eye. However, because Tanzania’s rural bias and the Fund's desire to raise 
the real price of exportables ran in parallel while the Fund missions never 
deemed it prudent to put forward formally their evident belief that salaries 
should be raised relative to wages and Tanzanian wage increases in 1980, 19 81 
and 1984 (there were none in 1 9 7 9, 1982 or 1 9 8 3) at most offset the previous 
years inflation, the actual income distribution debates have turned largely on 
agreeing prudent level of export crop price increases.
Similarly since 1979 the Fund missions have avoided targeting health, 
education and water specifically as areas for expenditure cuts. They have on 
the one hand reduced stress on recurrent spending cuts in respect to public 
services (where real spending has fallen steadily) and on the other 
concentrated on more effective attainment of Tanzanian targeted reductions in 
post-Amin defence spending and on reversing the rise in producer and - to a 
much lesser extent - consumer subsidies as a proportion of expenditure. Thus 
in fact income distribution and basic services have not at least since 1979, 
surfaced in an overtly ideological way.
Mismatched Model
Tanzania's post 1978 economic problems clearly do not flow from an increase in 
real resource use - with the brief exception of late 1978/early 1979 when 
external invasion did lead to resultant increases in military spending faster 
than to reductions in resource use elsewhere in the economy. They flow from 
external shocks: a 50$ 1977-81 fall in the terms of trade with negligible
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subsequent recovery, ^ the 1978-82 war and Uganda support costs consequential 
on Amin's 1978 invasion, drought (1975-78 were all average or above crop 
years; 1979» 1980, 1982, 1984 were severely weather affected with 1981 and 
1983 at best marginally below average), sluggish growth of export demand and 
the impact of negative international price signals on supply, the new 
investment requirements consequential on the 1977 breakup of the East African 
Community to replace previously used Kenya and Uganda based common services or 
specialised corporation units.
These led to draconic import cuts - 50$ odd in real terms between 1979-80 and
1982-83 (abstracting the unsustainably high 1978 and military equipment biased 
first half 1979 levels as well as the continued decline over 1983-84).^ 
These in turn led to a 50$ fall in manufactured goods output (reducing real 
government revenue by at least 25$ from what it would otherwise have been and 
starving the agricultural sector of incentive goods), generalised inadequacy 
of maintenance, radical deterioration of transport and agricultural processing 
capacity (flowing from fuel and other operating input shortages as well as 
inadequate maintenance). These in turn led to a government bank borrowing 
requirement averaging 25-30$ of recurrent revenue largely to cover recurrent 
account deficits (which had been consistently in small to moderate surplus to 
1978-79 see bank of Tanzania, 1984 Chapter 15) and to 25-30$ annual Cost of 
Living increases largely matched on the price side for peasant producers but 
leading to a fall in real wages of over 50$ from 1978 through 1984 and a
larger one for real salaries. Even these levels of import cuts did not avoid 
piling up $500 million odd of government debt, supplier credit, commercial 
trade and invisibles arrears by the end of 1983 (versus nil prior to late 
1978).
Tanzania was imprudent in 1977-78. It liberalised imports dramatically in mid 
1977 (following more cautious decompression over late 1975-76) and planned a 
large 1977-78 trade deficit precisely when the beverage boom was (and was 
projected by Tanzania) breaking. In fairness it did so in response to
repeated and vociferous Fund and Bank advice. Its 1977-78 through 1979-80
34recurrent Budgets were fiscally reckless (unlike those before or since). 
Over 1978-80 it used supplier credit heavily to postpone investment goods
import cuts at the price of mortgaging future export earnings (or accumulating 
arrears) if there was not a rapid export/external resource flow recovery. 




economy by the war and subsequently was, on frequent occasions, diverted from 
strategic planning by day to day crisis containment demands.
However, these factors were much smaller in their impact than the external 
shocks, and while reducing the efficiency of adjustment did not prevent 
massive real import or real government spending (recurrent and capital 
account) cuts. Further, in part they were consequential on the supply losses 
engendered by external shocks. It is difficult - in retrospect as at the time
- to see how macro monetary prestidigitation could have been a sufficient 
condition for stabilisation or any strategy not including (and backed by the 
external resources to achieve) supply restoration beginning with production 
input and maintenance import supply restoration could have provided a way 
toward adjustment and recovery.
IMF Rigidity and Tanzanian Reactions
Largely because of the near total divergence of Fund mission and Tanzanian 
analysis of underlying economic causes, mechanisms and strategic emphases 
required, negotiations have in practice turned on particular measures. Three 
have generated the most controversy - devaluation, grower prices and food 
subsidies.
Food price subsidies have never been seen as a permanent policy instrument in
Tanzania (except perhaps by some decision takers over 1982-83 in reaction
against IMF calls for instant abolition). Their use in 1973-7*1 to bridge
adjustments of grower and retail prices to world grain price leaps was overtly
interim, was ended and was followed by clawback of the interim subsidies by
higher than breakeven prices. Over 1977-79 they reemerged covertly because of
appalling accounting and supervision breakdowns in respect to grain 
3Smarketing. in 1980 they were identified, eliminated for rice and wheat and
- as an interim measure - consolidated on one product, maize meal (sembe) the 
most widely consumed staple. Initial intention to phase them out by 1983 were 
overtaken by reaction to IMF calls for instant abolition, sharply increased 
grower prices and the freezing of the minimum wage between July 1981 and June 
1984.
However, the total subsidy borne by the recurrent budget was 2 to 3% of total
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spending (another 1 to 2$ came from a cross subsidy from higher sugar prices) 
which raises serious doubt as to why the IMF chose to press the issue which 
was really one of phasing when its overall fiscal implications were minimal. 
In 1984 Tanzania restructured grain marketing and eliminated all food 
subsidies (as well as all grower input subsidies) with parallel 40$ grower 
price increases for maize, 160$ retail price increases for maizemeal and 35$ 
minimum wage increases.
Grower price arguments have been on practicabilities and responses not 
principles. While erratic, grower food pricing for peasant crops (affecting 
in principle under one half and in practice perhaps a quarter of marketed
food) has since 1974 maintained their real value. Since 1981 a similar policy 
has prevailed in respect to most industrial/export crops produced by peasants. 
In 1983 (for late 1983-1984 harvests) and 1984 (for 1984-85) 40$ increases
(5-10$ above projected inflation) have been the norm.
Tanzania has argued that:
a. without more import capacity to provide more inputs and incentive 
goods and more transport and processing capacity higher nominal 
increases could not be real for peasants either on capacity or 
incentive side and would simply fuel inflation;
b. with grower prices on average near 1977 real levels and real minimum 
wages down 60$ so that middle and lower middle peasant household 
consuming capacity was well above that of the minimum wage further 
urban to rural redistribution was economically dubious as well as
humanly, socially and - more problematically - politically 
impracticable and undesireable (ie if peasants respond to economic
n C
incentives/disincentives so do wage and salary earners).
In fact the 1983 and 1984 increases (paralleled by 0$ and 30-35$ minimum wage
increases) are already arguably beyond the limits of prudence on both counts.
The IMF has sought 25 to 50$ real increases at one go which would appear to
be physically impossible and has sought increases after crops are planted, 
fertilised etc. which could hardly have any significant output effect
but would have serious government or enterprise deficit and inflationary
. 37 impact.
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Devaluation is more complex. Through 1978 Tanzania had followed a policy of 
regular review of exchange rates with half a dozen 1971-1976 parity changes 
(all but one downward) and three changes in the currency or basket to which it 
was pegged. Because over 1961-1978 Tanzania had below world, and only 
moderately above OECD, inflation rates these moderate scattered adjustments 
prevented serious overvaluation up to 1980 at least in the opinion of the 
World Bank (World Bank 1 9 8 3, price distortion table). However, the basic
Tanzanian rationale turned on domestic concerns - inflation management and 
avoiding cuts in export crop grower prices.
In early 1979 at a time at which inflation was rising, terms of trade falling
and war costs unknown (Amin was still undefeated) Tanzania and the Fund missed 
the opportunity (proposed by some participants on each side) to go to six
monthly small adjustments (25? over 18-30 months was mentioned) to avoid 
buildup of overvaluation. A single 15? evaluation was made.
Thereafter the IMF steadily proposed 60? devaluations through mid 1984 -
apparently 20-30? in late 1984 following the 30? June devaluation - as 
preconditions with growing, but secondary, emphasis on a formula system for 
subsequent adjustments to offset excess Tanzanian inflation. The results were 
a unmitigated disaster:
a. the 1980 agreement called for a study on exchange rates (carried cut 
in two parallel halves by the Fund and Tanzania) but did not include 
(neither side proposed) any mechanism for small, moderately frequent, 
managerial (ie not cabinet level political) adjustments;
b. because the Fund was calling for a massive one shot devaluation the 
Tanzania study concentrated on demonstrating the weakness of that 
approach and paid little attention to alternative approaches to 
adjustment and especially to creeping overvaluation caused by the
q Q
combination of a dollar dominated peg and high inflation;
c. the reaction to 60? devaluation demands in Tanzania was to make the 
topic of devaluation a symbolic test of right or wrong (for the Fund 
and in Tanzania) paralysing Tanzanian response to the problem of 
creeping overvaluation (which reached 50 - 75? by mid 1983^9) until
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1983» The reductionism of the positions is only slightly overstated 
by characterising them as "massive devaluation now is good for your 
soul"; and "no devaluation now or ever";
d. the advocates of phased reversal of overvaluation in Tanzania were 
thus than buffeted from two sides - the Fund and the hard line 
reaction to it. As a result a 10$ adjustment to reverse appreciation 
caused by the dollar's rise was not agreed until 1982 (15$ was
proposed in mid 1981); the 15$ 1983 and 30$ 1984 devaluations were 
delayed and bunched versions of desired packages of smaller, more 
frequent measures; serious discussion of a means to depoliticise 
small, frequent changes to avoid a recurrence of creeping 
overvaluation did not begin until late 1984.
By late 1984 Tanzania was near return to its historic position - adjusting to 
avert real grower price cuts (and to avoid Treasury burdens from subsidising 
exports) and to avoid serious buildup of comparative inflation rate caused
overvaluation . Had there never been any IMF proposals it would probably have
reached that position by the end of 1981 and the mid 1984 exchange rate would 
probably have been Sh 20-22 to the USA$ (vs a Sh 23-25 rate for full 
maintenance of 1979 relativities and an actual rate of 17) with the Treasury 
and Bank of Tanzania carrying out two to four small adjustments annually to 
offset inflation.
In each of these cases. IMF rigidity has had a very high price. It has 
misdirected Tanzanian energy from phased solutions - which at least on the 
exchange rate some Fund personnel have decried as worse than useless - to 
arguing against massive one off ones and created emotional political symbols 
out of what had been largely economic managerial questions. Thereby it has 
slowed change in directions both the Fund and (even if for different reasons 
and on a phased basis) many Tanzanian analysts and economic decision takers 
wanted allowing imbalances to worsen and making changes when they happened too
lumpy and too late minimising their real economy incentive impact and
maximising their inflationary and human hardship potential.
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How Equally Treated?
At the formal level Tanzania has been treated evenly by the Fund. Through 
1976 it was a moderately large (relative to quota) and successful user of Fund 
resources. The 1980 programme - seen as the first tranche of an EFF agreement 
- was not small relative to quota.
However, Tanzania is a clear case of formal equality in access to IMF
resources meaning the exact opposite in terms of access to liquidity and 
bridging finance relative to adjustment requirements:
a. alternative sources of .liquidity have been limited - commercial bank 
credit has never been available on a substantial scale nor could 
Tanzania afford to use it; World Bank structural credit has not been 
available - since 19 80 precisely because of the lack of an IMF
agreement; while bilateral balance of payments support finance has
been sought and obtained it has, by itself, been inadequate and
increasingly constrained by lack of an IMF agreement;
b. therefore, Tanzania resorted (unwisely) to use of supplier credit and
(faute de mieux) to buildup of commercial arrears because it could
secure no less unsatisfactory bridging finance;
c. this need to do so resulting from the size of the external shocks -
probably of the order of $2,500 - $3,00 0 million over late 1978-1984 
and the inability to respond rapidly exacerbated by the failure to 
secure bridging finance and the resultant growth of capacity use and 
maintenance ’deferral’ real side barriers to adjustment.
In relation to external shocks Tanzania's access to liquidity was perhaps 1-2$ 
and to bridging finance 15-20$. This can hardly be seen as effective equal 
access to liquidity/bridging finance to ride out reversible and adjust to 
permanent effects of shocks.
Targets For Stabilisation or Collapse?
In 1979 no fiscal targets could have been realistic - in the middle of a war
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macro monetary forecasts are unlikely to have much precision. In 1980 the 
"trigger clauses" in retrospect can be seen to have guaranteed either instant 
or medium term collapse of the programme
a. the actual pipeline of import payments falling due was slightly
underestimated by the Tanzania side and then ’bargained’ down by the 
Fund so that the first two quarterly arrears targets could not have 
been met had all the Fund drawings been used for that purpose alone;
b. the overall domestic credit and specific government bank borrowing
ceilings were ’bargained’ down from the Treasury’s (as it happened 
realistic) view of what the actual seasonal pattern was again 
virtually guaranteeing a second quarter collapse after a single 
quarter of prestidigitation on receipt and payment timings;
c. the whole programme assumed (and indeed explicitly said it required)
a Bank SAL and additional bilateral balance of payments support to 
survive but the Fund did not take part in any attempt to secure 
these, Tanzania's detailed submissions were not ready until two 
months after the formal start of the programme and its SAL proposals 
never received any formal response at all so that by its own 
calculations the programme was doomed before the first - and only - 
drawings were approved two to three months after the dates the 
programme and "trigger clauses" covered;
d. no leeway existed in the targets for any adverse terms of trade
shifts (in the event substantial), for lags in Bank/bilateral 
receipts or for delayed output response to price incentives.
41In the event, the programme lasted one quarter. 1981 Treasury calculations 
suggest that had it survived and a SAL loan been received and disbursed 
promptly the year and credit ceilings and - less clearly - arrears levels 
could have been met consistent with sustaining the manufacturing 
output/general improved maintenance based real recovery allowed by partially 
restored imports in the second half of 1980 and snuffed out by first half 1981 
import cuts forced by its collapse.
Since then negotiations have never actually reached a target setting phase.
However, their general tone suggests that the IMF still:
a. grossly underestimates the time lag from IMF programme approval to 
complementary Bank and bilateral funding to actual arrival of imports 
to their use in production to actual availability as inputs and 
incentives to restored real government revenue and enhanced 
agricultural output and exports;
b. as well as still failing to accept the reality of a distinct seasonal
pattern in bank credit with the largest increases from June through
December for enterprises and July through mid March for the 
government;
c. and is not inclined to allow leeway - or ranges or adjustment formula
- for adverse exogenous shocks or lags in resource inflows or real
economy response outside Tanzania's control.
This would suggest that the danger of 'bargaining' on what should be genuinely 
non-partisan estimates and of premature collapse of potentially successful 
programmes remains high.
Expertise, Tact, Timing: .Some Deficiencies
The record of Fund and Tanzanian projections over 1979-84 does not suggest 
great expertise (or luck) on either side, but does suggest less on the Funds. 
Repeated failure to grasp (despite explanation) how certain data were compiled 
(eg cost of living by random purchase not official prices even where these 
existed, agriculture from overall physical production estimates with both 
methods of converting to current prices and of estimating proportion sold much 
shakier than the physical data) and lack of coherent understanding of - or 
apparent concern with real sectoral and micro issues hardly inspired 
confidence in their empirical or analytical expertise. The 1980 first and 
second quarter trigger adjustments that were the immediate cause of collapse 
were made against Tanzanian technical estimation which threw up figures much 
nearer actual results.
Similarly the Fund has consistently failed to offer proposals on export
-39-
strategy or policy (non-existent in Tanzania except in the vaguest form or in 
isolated areas until 1981 and still weak in articulation and effectiveness) 
beyond generalised higher price prescriptions. This presumably flows from 
deemphasis of real and sub-macro issues, but is a poor service to
stabilisation in the Tanzania context. Indeed in 1984 the Fund is believed to 
have advocated reintroducing export taxes on peasant crops which might be 
considered an odd way to increase grower incentives. In respect to
agricultural marketing costs the Fund has (quite correctly) taken an interest 
but again at a macro costing and macro institutional level providing little 
insight or assistance to Tanzanians wishing to achieve cost control (over both 
the public and private sub-sectors) in this sector.
The Fund’s recent past negotiating tactics - except in early 1979 and in 1980 
- have been characterised by consistent lack of tact or perception of the 
probable consequences of its absence. Missions have ranged in discussion and 
commentary far beyond the issues and policies under negotiation - often on the
basis of very little knowledge of Tanzania. They have appeared to deny the
reality of major cuts in resource use - including both real government 
spending on both recurrent and capital account - and of a broadly positive use 
of agricultural policy to sustain peasant incentives and have been unwilling 
to discuss questions of phasing and flexibility seriously, brushing them aside 
as attempts to avoid adjustment. This did nothing to create a viable working 
relationship between the Fund and Tanzania's Treasury/Central Bank team and a 
good deal to mobilise domestic opposition to any Treasury/Central Bank 
adjustment proposals which included any elements seeming similar to IMF 
proposals.
The 1979 and 1983 Mission Meetings with the President were peculiarly 
disastrous. The first - probably unintentionally - presented a still 
negotiable set of proposals as if they were ’take it or leave it' and the 
second chose to combine what appeared to be a broad critique in principle of 
socialism and self reliance with an apparent assertion that Tanzania had 
failed to adjust at all. In neither case should the meeting have been held - 
in 1979 the apparent error was a Tanzanian attempt to convince the President 
more energetic adjustment was needed; in 1983 it was apparently proposed by 
those who believed no agreement was possible. In both cases the IMF’s 
minatory, headmasterish tone and the President's predictable negative reaction 
to it led to recrimination and delay.
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The fact that Tanzania is responsive (probably over responsive) to rationally 
argued suggestions on most policy and operational topics, but very resistant 
to orders to make changes, especially when these seem to (or do) include basic 
political economic and value changes does not seem to be grasped by the Fund. 
In Tanzania an imposed programme (or one seen as externally imposed), even if 
formally adopted, cannot be enforced because nobody will feel committed to, 
and many will be committed against, it.
The Treasury understands this fact quite well. Unfortunately its attempts to 
build its own adjustment packages (after consultation, albeit not agreement 
with the Fund) and to launch them in the context of the Budget and 
accompanying measures has apparently been viewed by the Fund as wilful 
hostility. The individual who asked in 1984 how Tanzania dared adjust the 
exchange rate and prices without prior approval is an extreme case, but the 
undercurrent of objecting to self decided austerity and stabilisation measures 
as treading on Fund territory has been more general.
A final technical or negotiating problem is either a lack of any sense of 
urgency by the Fund or a shortage of personnel for negotiating missions. 
Tanzania cannot readily introduce packages of fiscal and macro-economic 
changes except in the context of the annual economic policy review culminating 
in the Budget. Nor - given the lag in any event from programme approval to 
real economy impact - can it offer much hope of significant real improvements 
until the last quarter of the first programme year. Further projections made 
for a year including programme inflows need total recosting (not just sliding 
forward) if agreement cannot be reached within one to three months of the 
start of the period they cover.
The Fund’s negotiating time table simply has not squared with these realities. 
In the most successful and quickest case about seven months elapsed from 
initial negotiations to first drawing. The June 1984 proposals - recast in 
October - had still not been the subject of full negotiations by a Fund 
mission empowered to discuss drawings as such by November 1984 while the Fund 
as of late 1984 appeared to believe February/March 1985 was the earliest 
possible date for programme effectiveness. While probably unfair both this 
record and some mission members' side comments (perhaps wrongly interpreted) 
have reinforced and widened the acceptance of suspicions its tactics are
designed to ’starve’ Tanzania into 'capitulation*.
Vulnerable Groups, Basic Needs, Participation and Stabilisation
Commitment to lesser inequality (among individuals and urban/rural), 
protecting victims of natural disasters, and achieving universal access to 
basic services (education, health, water) are central to Tanzanian politics 
and political economy (Bank of Tanzania, 1984, Chapters 2, 3, 4, 19). They
have been pursued consistently - if not always effectively - and backed by 
substantial resource allocations. Broadly they correspond to what the World 
Bank has termed ’absolute poverty eradication”, the ILO ’’basic needs” and 
UNICEF ’protecting vulnerable groups” combined in the context of transition to 
socialism albeit the Tanzanian commitment predates the international agency 
formulations and their terminology is not widely used in Tanzania.
Most Tanzanian decision takers - and many officials and managers - view any 
explicit or implicit attack on these commitments as a challenge to the 
legitimacy of their government and Party. As these elements are central to 
the present leadership's long term beliefs, actions and popular support they 
are probably objectively correct that abandoning them would require a change 
of leadership. It would also go against public opinion. The continued 
commitment to fairness and to sheltering the poor from economic shocks to the 
degree possible do explain the continued support for the Party and government 
- especially in rural areas - despite six years of economic unsuccess. 
Criticism is certainly common and open - especially in urban areas and among 
elites, not surprisingly as they have heen harder hit both by the shocks and 
by the government policies - but political stability based on mass support 
survives.
How effective these commitments and efforts to implement them have been in the 
context of falling real resources is problematic. The ILO ( 1933) and World 
Bank (1984a, passim) see considerable success and a UNICEF study (Jolly and 
Cornea, 1984) at least partial. Tanzanians are often more self critical (eg 
Bank of Tanzania 1984, Chapter 19) •
Equally how opposed the IMF is to these Tanzanian commitments is unclear. 
Certainly it does not take them very seriously and views their introduction
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into discussions as at best a diversion from serious macro monetary magnitude 
debates. This is, at the least, a misperception of Tanzanian realities and
constraints.
Since 1979 IMF missions have been careful not to challenge health, education 
and water expenditure directly and to argue against raaizemeal subsidies on the 
(less than totally accurate) ground that the beneficiaries were not poor 
people anyhow. However, their persistent animosity to price management,
differential import allocation (eg to basic consumer goods manufacturing) and 
food subsidies as well as occasional references to increasing the proportion 
of basic service costs covered by users have done nothing to remove the 
suspicion that they view the poor as somewhat irrelevant to production and 
therefore dispensable. A charitable interpretation would be that the IMF
personnel believe that if macro monetary stability is achieved all else wil be 
added on to it including "trickle down" to the poor. That in itself is
empirically dubious and - in Tanzania - political economically unsaleable. 
Further the nature of 1979-84 Fund - Tanzania relations has not encouraged 
most Tanzanians to give the Fund the benefit of the doubt on ambiguities.
Shock Costs vs Liquidity/Bridging Finance Procured
Tanzania’s external shock losses over 1978 - 1984 have been of the order of 
$2,500 - 3j000 million at current account deficit level. They include:
a. $1,500 - 2,000 million terms of trade losses;
b. $500 million import costs of war with Amin and subsequent support of
Ugandan governments through 1981;
c. $300 - 500 million lost exports and increased imports from drought
(excluding costs of lower food availability);
d. $100 million export quantity loss from sluggish world demand growth
and negative incentives to producers from lower world prices;
e. $50 million replacement investment to replicate East African
42Community/Corporation facilities after its breakup;
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f. $25 - 40 million cost of higher world interest rates (on Bank, IMF, 
supplier credits).
To offset this Tanzania has secured perhaps $25 - 40 million in liquidity 
(SDRs, Stabex) and $450 - 500 million in World Bank sectoral and bilateral 
balance of payments support credits and grants additional to ongoing project 
finance. Net use of IMF resources has not in fact been substantial taking the 
period as a whole with new drawings and repayments about equal. Thus the 
liquidity received has been of the order of _1_$ and bridging finance (medium to 
high conditionality) 15 to 20% of direct current account external shock 
impact.
About $500 million of 'adjustment* has taken the form of arrears and perhaps 
$100 million of supplier credits so that the remaining $1,500 - 2,000 million 
has been absorbed via a multiplied loss of output - probably at least 25 - 30$ 
at GDP and 70$ of manufactured goods levels by 1984 compared with what would 
have been the case had the shocks not occurred, been reversed or had adequate 
liquidity/bridging finance been available. This would not have been enough to 
allow substantial real growth per capita over 1978-84 but would have averted 
its 25$ odd fall. Further had such a stabilisation base existed, it is 
reasonable to assume that resources and attention would have been available to 
concentrate on structural adjustment with some real increase in output per 
capita resulting from 1981 to 1982 onwards.
By 1984 any viable stabilisation - rehabilitation - recovery package for 
Tanzania needed to be for at least five years and of the order of $1,500 
million excluding ($2,000 million including) elimination of arrears. Net IMF 
finance (subtracting repayment of about $50 million previous drawings 
outstanding) could hardly exceed $300 to $350 million over 3 years given 
present quota tied drawing limits. Therefore any stabilisation package would 
require complementary Bank and bilateral components and any realistic IMF 
approach would include seeking to mobilise such a package eg:
a. $350 million IMF (including some rollover in years 4 and 5);
b. $500 million World Bank structural and sectoral IDA funding over five
years;
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c. $750 - 1000 million bilateral production import support grants or
soft credits over five years;
d. perhaps $75 -150 million interest and repayment burden reduction by a 
major rescheduling of 1984 arrears and 1985-1989 payments on 
principal of government to government loans and export credits to 
1990 -2000 .
Given significant rehabilitation response and additional exports from
restructuring such a programme might restore 1979-80 import levels by its
fourth or fifth year and support an average annual growth of 5% a year (1.6 to 
48
2% per capita J) over the programme, thus clawing back two fifths of the
1978—1984 fall. It cannot, therefore, be said to be particularly grandiose in 
44ambitions.
However, to date no progress has been made toward articulating, much less
negotiating, such a package:
a. the IMF is not interested in doing either until/unless it has an
agreed programme with Tanzania (ironically using projections of the
hypothetical other inflows as part of the data on which ’trigger
clauses” are set);
b. without the IMF's ’seal of approval” the World Bank (unless it alters 
its SAL policy parameters) cannot conclude a structural adjustment 
programme and with no clear date for an IMF Standby in sight has been 
hesitant to begin serious consultation and negotiation;
c. bilateral sources are similarly unwilling to negotiate individually -
much less attend a pledging conference analogous to Zimbabwe’s
Zimcord - until an IMF programme is in place;
d. Paris Club debt rescheduling in practice is possible only with an IMF 
programme in place (assuming the debtor is an IMF member) and is 
useful only in tandem with a parallel new funds package;
e. these barriers to immediate action (and the time consumed in 
repetitive preparation for and engaging in negotiations with the IMF)
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have deterred Tanzania from giving adequate attention to articulating 
a programme to present to the Bank, bilateral sources and, perhaps, 
the Paris Club as soon as an IMF Standby is negotiated or of holding 
preliminary discussions on modalities for rapid negotiations toward 
its effectiveness.
Thus any 1985 Standby runs a high risk of collapsing within six to nine months 
because the complementary resource inflows used in projecting its targets 
cannot become effective in time.
A Cautionary Postnote or Prelude
Given the very sharp adjustment measures taken in the 1984-85 Tanzania Budget
(many of them imprudent in any context other than continued lack of access to
external liquidity and bridging finance and others arguably placing too much
weight on price changes in the absence of real resources to allow responses to
them - both weaknesses likely to appear as strengths in terms of IMF 
45perception ), and the perception of these by certain other international and 
bilateral development coordination bodies as evidence of a clear commitment to 
a strong adjustment strategy along broadly satisfactory lines eligible for 
external financial support, a Tanzania - IMF agreement in 1985 is by no means 
impossible, albeit far from certain.
Whether it will be satisfactory or durable is even more problematic:
a. even at maximum size it can provide only about a quarter of the
liquidity and bridging finance requirements excluding, or under a
fifth including, elimination of commercial arrears;
b. no coherent adjustment for prompt conclusion of complementary World
Bank (structural adjustment or sectoral) and bilateral (import
support) programmes to complete the adjustment support package have 
been made;
c. therefore, the lag between an IMF programme becoming effective and
the arrival of significant physical goods inflows to Tanzania seems 
likely to be at least nine months (three months from funding to order
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bo delivery following six months for Bank and bilateral programme 
design and negotiation);
d. and another three months before the goods produced from them are 
available, six to twelve months before rehabilitation investment can 
come to fruition and at least as long before agricultural production 
can respond to increased inputs transport, processing and incentive 
goods availability;
e. so that negligible export improvement can be expected until well into 
the second year of the programme and very limited government real 
revenue recovery until very late in the first - realities not likely 
to be seen by the IMF as compatible with rapid adjustment or taken 
into account in "trigger clause" setting;
f. a problem likely to be aggravated by the IMF’s tendency to treat 
technical estimates (eg of quarterly borrowing and external cash flow 
patterns) as proper topics for combative negotiation (which may 
endanger the programme even if year end targets are attainable) and 
unwillingness to build in any leeway for external shocks or lags in 
external resource inflows;
g. so that any programme agreed is likely to remain operative only if 
(as was the case in the first Zambia EFF) very substantial numbers of 
prompt waivers of quarterly performance criteria and regular upward 
revision of future ones is agreed by the IMF during the first two 
Standby’s (assuming there is to be a series of three annual 
agreements not an EFF);
h. that outcome is rendered less likely by the fact that any agreement 
reached will be despite basic differences in IMF perceptions of the 
causes, mechanisms and cures of the 1979-84 economic decline. The 
IMF is still working on a (albeit modified) macro monetary demand 
control price change fuelled model and Tanzania on a disaggregated, 
real, supply restoration fuelled one in which macro monetary and 
fiscal policy is seen as providing a supporting framework and price 
changes as one of several facilitating instruments. The Tanzania 
model is relatively similar to the World Bank's current implicit SSA
. » . ^
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Notes
1. Reg Green is a professorial fellow at the Institute of Development 
Studies (Sussex). He was Economic Advisor to the Tanzanian Treasury 
over 1966-74 and 1980 and has been a consultant to it in respect to 
international monetary issues over 1964-65, 1979 and 1981-84. He
served on the Group of 24's Expert Group on ’Low Income Countries and 
the International Monetary System’, on the 1976-78 and 1983-84 
Developing Country Adjustment Studies carried out by UNCTAD for the 
Group of 24 and on the 'Imported Inflation' study carried out by IDS 
for the Kuwait Fund. He wishes to emphasise that the views and 
analysis of this article are his own responsibility and are not 
necessarily those of the Tanzania or Zimbabwe Treasuries, of UNCTAD, 
of the Kuwait Fund or of the Group of 24.
2. For a fuller presentation of the case for such an approach see Patel,
. 1984.
3. For the case for attempting such a systemic change following and 
building on a more limited set of specific measures see Commonwealth 
Secretariat, 1983-
4. While much of the Tanzanian material used is verbal or unpublished,
none is deemed to be secret by Tanzania. For a detailed description
of Tanzania-IMF relations through 19 81 see 'Political-Economic 
Adjustment and IMF Conditionality: Tanzania, 1974-81' by the present
author in Williamson 1983.
5. Similar summaries suggesting that most programmes fall significantly 
short of goals and that results are not uniformly better than 
pre-programme period performance have been given by IMF officials to 
African Association of Central Banks meetings.
6. However, the Fund has - at least publicly - made little effort to 
exert leadership or to create a favourable climate of 
Treasury/Central Bank/Commercial Bank opinion for such changes.
7» For a fuller account see the present author's "From Deepening
Economic Malaise Toward Renewed Development: Notes Toward African
Agendas For Action", Journal of Development Planning, Forthcoming.
8. It is quite unreasonable to expect that SSA governments could project
industrial economy and global economic performance better than the 
Fund, Banks and OECD. UNCTAD in fact did so but hardly has the 
prestige (or readership) for its less palatable forecasts to override 
those of the 'big three’ as a basis for SSA national policy 
formulation.
9* Commercial bank credit is usually neither available nor affordable on
a substantial scale. The possible additional sources are, for • 
bridging finance, World Bank structural adjustment and bilateral
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import support programmes and, for liquidity, Stabex.
10. The Fund does demand state action to alter four sets of prices -
exchange rates, interest rates, grower prices and subsidised goods. 
However, it does so as a second best, it clearly sees the return of 
these prices to market control as the optimal, medium term solution.
11. In respect to clearly socialist economies, the Fund is more pragmatic 
concentrating on specific queries as to controls, interventions and 
operating efficiency and proposing changes toward a "socialist market 
economy” not toward capitalism as such.
12. Arguably the IMF leans harder on governments whose policies it
considers unsound if it believes they may well lose an election (or
otherwise give place to) an opposition whose views are more in tune
with IMF prescriptions and is more concerned with avoiding forcing a 
government it views as basically sympathetic to its prescriptions 
into a political box (or coffin). The number of riots, strikes and 
other social disorders (none of them very good for production or the 
balance of payments) following attempts to implement IMF agreements 
cast some doubt on how perceptive it is as to the limits on 
government actions and public acquiescence.
13* Even in African economies with significant manufacturing capacity and 
exports - eg Zimbabwe (Kadhari and Green, 1985) - the problems of 
achieving a significant rise in total exports by raising those of the 
manufacturing sector are different in kind from those of an 
industrial economy or a NIC.
14. This appears to apply to coffee, tea, cocoa, tobacco, cotton, sugar, 
sisal, palm oil, copper and probably tropical timber and hides and 
skins.
15. The financing requirement (which includes borrowing to finance 
investment) is not usefully termed a deficit for a government any 
more than for an enterprise. The recurrent budget deficit is a 
deficit. Fund use of "deficit” when it actually is speaking of 
financing requirement is unhelpful for most analytical purposes and 
for coherent discourse.
16. This is explored at greater length in Dell, Lawrence, Helleiner
1983-84. Because of the higher import content of investment, under 
conditions of foreign exchange constraint, more investment results in 
less total GDP.
17. The Bank (at least in 1984a) is not particularly ideological. There 
is an underlying faith in markets and prices which approaches being 
ideological but is significantly tempered by pragmatism and 
realisation of their limitations.
18. e.g. an official who saw IMF draft letters of interest for the Ivory 
Coast and (then) Upper Volta said only the country names and numbers,
not the text, differed. Given the very major structural differences 
between the two economies this suggests either remarkable 
inflexibility or a very high level of macro abstraction from the real 
economies.
19* The IMF's recent enthusiasm for multiple exchange rates - even for
countries such as Tanzania whose trade structures seem unsuitable for
them and whose governments do not wish them on fairly orthodox 
grounds - is a different matter. It is basically a temporary, 
temporising tactic to split the domestic price (and political) impact 
by temporarily devaluing less in respect to a limited range of
politically sensitive imports and then consolidating at the higher 
(lower domestic currency value) rate over 6 to 18 months.
20. The point is not that the changes proposed necessarily injure
vulnerable groups or poor people, especially if parallel measures to
avert this are taken, but that the Fund shows no interest in 
analysing such impacts or taking such measures.
21. In some cases of extreme tax laxity government revenue increase
targets are included but usually in nominal terms.
22. The IMF does, at times waive one or more quarterly criteria but only
on a "grace and favour" basis and without any ascertainable standards
allowing a country to determine in advance how to act to secure a
waiver.
23- Statistics are a major area of post 1979 deterioration in SSA.
Admittedly many were never very good but many now look more like 
telephone numbers than reasoned estimates. eg for one country over 
the 1970s annual agricultural output growth is shown as 4.9% (and 
non-food output growth as negative), population growth as 3% odd, 
food availability as declining about a year (despite low food 
imports in the base period relative to the final comparison period).
24. In fairness to the Fund it must be admitted that on specifics the 
Bank (1984a) is also relatively weak and incomplete.
25. Certainly imbalance caused by bad policy leads to a need to adjust 
but as with irreversible external shock adjustment there is still a 
case for bridging finance to limit the costs and reduce the period 
necessary for adjustment.
26. The time frame is so relaxed at times as to give credibility to 
suggestion interpreting IMF tactics as that increasing pressures will 
reduce government insistence on serious negotiation. Even from an 
IMF perspective delay has costs - the economy is still more 
imbalanced and stabilisation grows more elusive and costly as time 
passes.
27. The World Bank (1984b) is critical of the IMF on this ground, at 
least implicitly.
This criticism is not applicable to projects with rapid, short term 
export enhancing or existing import decreasing capacity.
See Green, Rwegasira, Van Arkadie, 1981; ILO, 1983; Green in 
Williamson, 1983; Stewart, 1984, Bank of Tanzania, 1984 for more 
detailed data on and analyses of Tanzania.
The January 1977 drawing - at a time foreign exchange reserves were 
rapidly rising and well above critical levels - could have been 
rejected on "lack of need" grounds. That it was not suggests that up 
to that date the Fund view of overall Tanzania policy and performance 
was relatively positive.
The Fund apparently does perceive Tanzania as socialist. The public 
enterprise sector has not been condemned as such or recommendations 
made for its general phasing out (a contrast with, eg, Jamaican 
experience).
Terms of Trade data for Tanzania since 1976 are back of envelope or 
global proxy because the previous series was done by an East African 
Community unit. The global proxy data when crosscheckable overstate 
actual export prices and understate these for imports exaggerating 
the quantitative decline in exports and underestimating that of 
imports.
The probable real changes were:
Grain + 200$
Other Food - 90$
Health/Education/Water - 70$
Other Consumer Goods
(to USA $ 0.25 per capita) - 90$
Petroleum and Products - 30$
Agricultural Inputs
Other Manufacturing Inputs - 60$
Transport Equipment - 60$
(including Spares)
Machinery/Plant - 5 0/6 0$
Construction Materials - 60/70$
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Because terms of trade data were among the costs of EAC breakup these 
are partial internal estimates from Bank of Tanzania data. Fund and 
Bank data differ because they use global proxies which appear to 
underestimate import price increases - probably because with the 
growth of arrears has come a risk-and waiting ’surcharge’ on normal 
prices.
34. In 1977-78 luck (and bad estimation) on revenue allowed ex post 
balance - unfortunately as it doubtless encouraged still greater 
imprudence in 1978-79 Budget Estimates.
35. Over 1975-80 Tanzania delegated major agricultural policy and 
supervision functions to a _de facto autonomous Marketing Development 
Bureau. The record of oversight, failure to supervise, collapse of 
parastatal cost and physical control and absurd price relationships 
it achieved before the damage it was doing was perceived in 1980 
sheds no credit on the FAO (who initially staffed it), the World Bank 
(who financed it and in whose name its senior staff claimed to act) 
or Tanzania (which failed to supervise or control it).
3 6. In 1977 unpublished estimates done in connection with an ILO study 
suggested that average peasant household consuming power was 75? of 
the minimum wage; ILO, 1983 estimated approximate equality as of 
1981, on the same basis the 1984 ratio is of the order of 125-14055 
(ie peasant household above minimum wage). Both have declined in 
absolute terms - perhaps 20-25? for peasant households and 55-60? for 
minimum wage earners over 1977-1984.
37. The very visible 1979-1984 increases in lateness and absenteeism and 
declines in diligence and morale are evidence in favour of that 
contention.
3 8. The author - as one of the analysts working on that report - was 
among those who were seduced into this tunnel vision stance.
39. The Fund estimated 77?> the Bank (implicitly, based on its shadow 
rate for Tanzanian studies) thought it about 50? and the Tanzania 
Treasury about 55?. The divergence depends on the weights given to 
comparison currencies. The Treasury basket was trade share weighted, 
the Funds bore little relation to trade shares.
40. Tanzanian participants - including again the author - did realise the 
risk but underestimated its severity.
41. Partly presented in Minister for Finance’s 1980/81 Budget Speech.
42. The EAC breakup is treated as external because its basic causes were 
the impact of the Amin regime on the Community and strains on 
payments resulting from the 1973 -74 external economic crisis.
43. Raw intercensal data suggest a 3*3? annual population growth rate but 
have not been subjected to detailed demographic analysis. To do so
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would probably reduce the rate to the 2.8 to 3.0*6 range as the latest 
Census was fairly clearly a more complete enumeration than of 19 6 7.
44. Treasury and World Bank calculations are relatively similar given 
comparable external finance projections. Their actual projections 
diverge somewhat from those here (and from each other) primarily 
because of different overall external bridging finance projections.
45. These were faute de mieux decisions, their inflation and 
parallel/illegal market aggravating potential was perceived by the 
relevant Tanzanian analysts and decision takers.
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